In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye multipolar world Organization of Turkic States Africa Gulf diplomacy

Where Is Türkiye Positioning Itself in a Multipolar Order? Turkic States, Africa and the Gulf

Outlook analysis of how Türkiye uses the Organization of Turkic States, Africa and Gulf diplomacy to navigate a multipolar world while staying in NATO.

By Geopolitical Horizon Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,930 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) grew out of the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and was renamed at the Istanbul Summit on 2021-11-12, when members adopted the Turkic World Vision 2040.
Türkiye has pursued an 'Opening to Africa' policy since 1998 and has held observer status at the African Union since 2005, with its Somalia engagement now spanning humanitarian, military-training, maritime and energy cooperation.
Gulf ties moved from rivalry to economic partnership after the January 2021 Al-Ula declaration, with the Türkiye–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed on 2023-03-03.
Ankara presents all three tracks as complements to, not substitutes for, NATO membership (since 1952) and EU candidacy (since 1999), while Western and regional analysts disagree on whether this is hedging or strategic autonomy.
The decisive test for Türkiye's multipolar strategy is whether summit diplomacy converts into durable institutions, trade corridors and security arrangements accepted by partners and rivals alike.

Why It Matters

Türkiye is positioning itself in a multipolar order through three overlapping platforms: the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), a long-running partnership policy in Africa (with Somalia as its deepest case) and a re-balanced relationship with the Gulf monarchies. Ankara states that these tracks complement, rather than replace, its NATO membership and EU candidacy. For policymakers, the open question is whether this web of partnerships becomes a durable source of strategic autonomy or remains a set of loosely connected, personality-driven initiatives.

Background

This section sets out institutional milestones and agreements as matters of record. Assessments follow in later sections.

The Turkic States track

The Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (the 'Turkic Council') was established by the Nakhchivan Agreement of 2009-10-03 by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Türkiye. Uzbekistan joined later, and Hungary received observer status in 2018.
On 2021-11-12 the Istanbul Summit renamed the body the Organization of Turkic States and adopted the Turkic World Vision 2040. Its secretariat is in Istanbul.
At the Samarkand Summit on 2022-11-11, Turkmenistan and the Turkish Cypriot constituent state were accepted as observers, according to OTS and Turkish statements.
Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations on 2021-06-15. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (opened 2017-10-30) and the Trans-Caspian 'Middle Corridor' are the main connectivity projects linking Türkiye to Central Asia.

The Africa track

Türkiye adopted an 'Opening to Africa' policy in 1998. It gained observer status at the African Union in 2005, which the AU upgraded to strategic partnership in 2008.
Türkiye–Africa Partnership Summits were held in Istanbul (2008), Malabo (2014) and Istanbul again (2021). The Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA) reports a diplomatic network of more than 40 embassies on the continent, up from about a dozen in the early 2000s.
Somalia became the emblematic case after the 2011 famine, when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Mogadishu. Türkiye reopened its embassy, TIKA (the Turkish development agency) and Turkish NGOs expanded aid, and Turkish Airlines began flights to Mogadishu in 2012. A military training facility (TURKSOM) opened in Mogadishu in 2017.
On 2024-02-08 Türkiye and Somalia signed defense-and-economic cooperation agreements, and later energy and hydrocarbon arrangements. On 2024-12-11 the 'Ankara Declaration' recorded a Türkiye-facilitated understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia after the dispute triggered by Ethiopia's January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland.
Turkish trade with Africa has been reported by Turkish authorities at roughly $30–35 billion annually in recent years; Ankara has publicly set a much higher target. Figures vary by year and methodology.

The Gulf track

A Türkiye–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) strategic dialogue dates from 2008. A bilateral agreement with Qatar in 2014 underpins a Turkish military presence there.
The 2017 Gulf crisis strained ties, with Türkiye supporting Qatar. The Al-Ula declaration of 2021-01-05 formally ended the rift.
Normalization followed: Erdoğan visited Abu Dhabi (February 2022) and Jeddah (April 2022). A Gulf tour in July 2023 produced investment and trade announcements. The Türkiye–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed on 2023-03-03.
Defense trade has grown; Turkish drone manufacturers have announced export deals with Gulf customers (see How Have Turkish Drones Changed Deterrence?).

Alliance anchors

Türkiye joined NATO on 1952-02-18 and has been an EU candidate since the 1999 Helsinki Council. Accession talks opened in 2005; the EU–Türkiye Customs Union has applied since 1996, and the EU–Türkiye Statement of 2016-03-18 governs migration cooperation. For a sister-publication perspective on this dual anchoring, see Bloc Politics: Is Türkiye a Bridge Between Blocs?.

Timeline

Date	Milestone
1998	'Opening to Africa' policy launched
2005	Observer status at the African Union
2009-10-03	Nakhchivan Agreement founds the Turkic Council
2011	Erdoğan visits Mogadishu; Somalia engagement expands
2021-01-05	Al-Ula declaration ends the Gulf rift
2021-11-12	Turkic Council becomes the OTS; Vision 2040 adopted
2022-11-11	Samarkand Summit grants observer status to Turkmenistan and the Turkish Cypriot state
2023-03-03	Türkiye–UAE CEPA signed
2024-02-08	Türkiye–Somalia defense and economic agreements signed
2024-12-11	Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia

Key Players & Positions

Each actor's stance is summarized from its own public statements and policy documents; where official wording is paraphrased, this is indicated.

Actor	Stated or evident position
Azerbaijan	Treats Türkiye as its closest ally ('one nation, two states' is a widely used political formula) and a key partner in the Middle Corridor and OTS.
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan	Support cooperation on trade, transport, culture and investment, but officially pursue 'multi-vector' foreign policies and avoid exclusive blocs; Turkmenistan joined only as an observer.
Russia and China	Maintain primary security, economic and infrastructure ties in Central Asia (CSTO and EAEU for Russia; Belt and Road for China). Both publicly prefer cooperation with Türkiye, though commentary in each country watches Turkic integration closely.
Somalia (Federal Government)	Describes Turkish cooperation as support for state-building, security training, infrastructure and now maritime and energy development.
Ethiopia and Egypt	Ethiopia seeks sea access and engaged with Ankara's mediation; Egypt has backed Mogadishu and opposed Ethiopia's arrangement with Somaliland. Regional rivalries limit Ankara's room for manoeuvre.
African Union	Welcomes partnership frameworks and has engaged Türkiye as a strategic partner while emphasizing African ownership.
Gulf states (Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia)	Qatar is a close defense and political partner; the UAE and Saudi Arabia moved from rivalry to trade and investment ties, while competing for influence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere.
NATO	Treats Türkiye as a core ally; Türkiye ratified Finland's (2023) and Sweden's (January 2024) accession. Allies periodically raise concerns over Türkiye's Russia-related trade and defense choices.
European Union	Maintains candidate status but has described accession negotiations as stalled since 2018 Council conclusions; keeps cooperation on migration, trade and energy.

🇹🇷 Strategic Doctrine · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position (Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine)

Ankara's officially stated approach is what the Turkish MFA calls an 'enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy' within the 'Century of Türkiye' vision. The points below reflect official Turkish positions, not editorial findings.

Complementarity, not alternatives. According to the Presidency and the MFA, NATO membership under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty remains a cornerstone of Turkish security, and EU membership remains a declared strategic goal. Ankara argues that engaging Central Asia, Africa and the Gulf is consistent with these anchors and that the EU has itself stalled the accession process despite the Customs Union and the 2016 migration statement.
OTS as a cooperation platform among sovereign states. The Turkish MFA describes the OTS as grounded in the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity. The 2022 observer status for Turkish Cypriots is presented by Ankara as recognition of their right to international engagement. Note that the Republic of Cyprus government rejects this, and UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) call the 1983 declaration of the TRNC legally invalid, a point Türkiye disputes.
Africa partnership on 'equal partnership' terms. Official Turkish texts stress non-conditionality, support for Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the legal basis of bilateral agreements ratified by the Grand National Assembly (TBMM). Ankara frames the Ankara Declaration of 2024 as mediation consistent with the UN Charter's emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes.
Gulf diplomacy based on interest, not alignment. Ankara describes the post-2021 thaw as an economic and political normalization with Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, while keeping its defense cooperation with Qatar under the 2014 agreement. Turkish officials link Gulf engagement to diplomacy on Gaza and Syria.
Reform of global governance. Under the slogan 'The world is bigger than five,' Türkiye argues that UN Security Council reform is needed to reflect Africa, the Muslim world and the Global South. See The Political Anatomy on UN Security Council reform and COP31. Türkiye's mediation record, including the grain corridor, is examined in What Did the Black Sea Grain Initiative Teach Us About Future Food Security Corridors? and in Straits Watch.

The defense-industrial dimension, which Ankara cites as the base of its strategic autonomy, is covered in What Does Türkiye's 80% Domestic Defense Production Rate Mean for Strategic Autonomy?.

Source Comparison

Different source communities describe the same facts in different terms. The table summarizes recurring frames, not individual statements.

Question	Western / international framing	Regional framing	Turkish official framing
Why engage these regions?	Hedging, 'neo-Ottoman' ambition or transactional opportunism	Partnership offering an alternative to traditional great-power patrons	Enterprising, humanitarian and multidimensional foreign policy serving shared interests
OTS	Cultural bloc turning into a political and economic grouping; a question mark over Russian and Chinese reactions	Useful platform, but members guard multi-vector autonomy	Cooperation among sovereign states under the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and Vision 2040
Somalia and the Horn	Military footprint and resource interests; risk of entanglement in Ethiopia–Somalia–Egypt rivalries	Mogadishu welcomes assistance; Addis Ababa and Cairo see risks and opportunities differently	Support for a sovereign Somalia, capacity-building and mediation (Ankara Declaration)
Gulf	Rivalry turned into pragmatic trade and defense ties	Gulf capitals hedge and compete for influence	Normalization based on mutual benefit; no alignment against third parties
NATO and EU	Concerns over reliability, Russia ties and divergence from EU conditionality	Partners see Türkiye's NATO and EU links as a source of leverage	NATO a cornerstone; EU membership a strategic goal; partnerships are complementary

Assessment: what to watch

The following is editorial assessment, not official Turkish position:

Institutional depth. The OTS will be judged on investment funds, customs and transport integration rather than summit declarations.
Horn of Africa balance. Türkiye's Somalia role depends on managing Ethiopian, Egyptian and Gulf interests without being drawn into escalation.
Gulf durability. Economic agreements are a stronger foundation than the personal diplomacy of 2022–2023, but competing regional agendas remain.
Alliance credibility. Türkiye's capacity to act as a convening middle power rests on keeping its NATO and EU channels functional; a rupture would reduce, not enlarge, its leverage.
Climate and governance agenda. Türkiye's COP31 hosting and its Zero Waste initiative may become a soft-power bridge to African and Gulf partners (see Borders & Blocs on COP31 and Zero Waste).

Multipolar order: an international system with several centers of power rather than one or two dominant blocs.
Strategic autonomy: the capacity to make and execute foreign and security decisions without dependence on a single patron. See Türkiye's 80% domestic defense production rate.
Middle Corridor: the Trans-Caspian trade route linking China and Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye.
Turkish Cypriots / TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Türkiye; its observer status in the OTS is contested by the Republic of Cyprus.
Editorial standards: how this site separates fact from position is explained in Editorial Principles.

This article reflects Geopolitical Horizon's editorial perspective that presents and defends Türkiye's official positions alongside legal and historical context. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official statements and archival records. Geopolitical Horizon presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Geopolitical Horizon Editorial Team

Frequently asked questions

What is the Organization of Turkic States?

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an intergovernmental body that grew from the 2009 Nakhchivan Agreement and was renamed at the Istanbul Summit on 2021-11-12. Its full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, and its secretariat is in Istanbul. Hungary, Turkmenistan and the Turkish Cypriot state hold observer status.

Does Türkiye's outreach to Africa and the Gulf conflict with its NATO membership?

Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952, and Ankara states that its partnerships elsewhere complement that membership. Allies have raised concerns on specific issues such as Russia-related trade and defense procurement, but no NATO treaty provision bars members from partnerships with non-members. Analysts differ on whether this amounts to hedging or strategic autonomy.

Why is Somalia central to Türkiye's Africa policy?

Somalia became a showcase after Erdoğan's 2011 visit during the famine, followed by aid, infrastructure, the 2017 TURKSOM training facility and the 2024 defense and economic agreements. Ankara presents this as support for Somali sovereignty and state-building. Regional actors, including Ethiopia and Egypt, view the engagement through their own rivalries over the Horn of Africa.

How did Türkiye's relations with Gulf states change after 2021?

After the Al-Ula declaration of 2021-01-05 ended the Gulf rift, Türkiye normalized relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia while keeping its close ties with Qatar. The Türkiye–UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement was signed on 2023-03-03, and Erdoğan toured Gulf capitals in July 2023. Competition for regional influence continues alongside the economic cooperation.

Is Türkiye still pursuing EU membership?

Türkiye remains an EU candidate (since 1999) and the Turkish government describes membership as a strategic goal. The EU has described accession talks as stalled since 2018, while cooperation continues through the 1995 Customs Union and the 2016 migration statement. Ankara argues that the EU has not fulfilled several commitments, whereas EU institutions cite concerns about rule of law and foreign policy alignment.

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